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JERRY L. McKEAN and/or Supreme Court No. 20508 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Applicant/Respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests that the Industrial 
Commission's denial of appellant's Motion for Review be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents accept the statements of the case and of the 
facts presented by the Appellants' Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Administrative Law Judge's finding that respondent, Jerry 
McKean's, burn injury occurred within the "quasi-course of 
employment" is proper and his injury is therefore compensable. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondent McKean's injury i s compensable also on the basis that 
the subsequent burn injury was a d i rec t and natura l r e su l t of the 
primary injury to Mr. McKean's arm. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUBSEQUENT INJURY TO THE APPLICANT WAS A RESULT 
OF THE PRIMARY INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND WAS SUSTAINED 
DURING THE "QUASI-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.11 
Appellants contend that the Administrative Law Judge based 
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order solely upon the 
basis of Professor Larson's analysis of the "quasi-course of 
employment1' concept. Appellants further contend that the concept 
of "quasi-course of employment" is not a part of Utah law and that 
even if such a concept was a part of Utah law it was misapplied in 
the instant case. 
The Administrative Law Judge did not base his Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law solely upon the theory of 
"quasi-course of employment" as put forth by Professor Larson in 
his treatise of workman's compensation. The theory of 
"quasi-course of employment" was only one basis for the 
Adninistrative Law Judge's Findings. The Administrative Law Judge 
had also found that the applicant was n<?t negligent in his conduct 
and, therefore, there was no break in the chain of causation, thus 
finding that the subsequent injury was directly related to the 
primary injury. Thus, even if it is found that the Adninistrative 
Law Judge committed error in finding that Mr. McKean's injuries 
2 
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were a result of "quasi-course of employment,11 his decision would 
still stand since there was also a finding that the subsequent 
injury was a result of the industrial injury and was not based on 
any negligence of Mr. McKean. 
Appellants contend that there is no Utah case law that show 
that Utah has adopted Professor Larson's theory of "quasi-course 
of employment." Appellants, however, have failed to show any Utah 
cases that specifically reject the concept of "quasi-course of 
employment.11 
Professor Larson defined his concept of "quasi-course of 
employment" as follows: 
Activities undertaken by the employee following 
upon his injury which, although they take place outside 
the time and space limits of employment, would not be 
considered employment activities for usual purposes, are 
nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that 
they are necessary reasonable activities that would not 
have been undertaken but for the compensable injury. 
Larson, Volume I, Section 13.11(d). 
An injury arising out of a quasi-course activity does not 
break the causal chain by mere negligence of the applicant. The 
chain may only be broken by the intentional conduct of the 
applicant which would be regarded as expressly and impliedly 
prohibited by the employer. Thus, under the quasi-course of 
employment concept, more than mere negligence must be shown on the 
part of the applicant to establish that the causal chain had been 
broken. 
Appellants would contend that the quasi-course of employment 
3 
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test should not be applied in the instant case and would argue 
that a stricter test should be applied, providing that mere 
negligence is sufficient to break the causal chain where an injury 
did not arise out of the quasi-course of employment. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that the activities of Mr. 
McKean were necessary and reasonable and, thus, did not break the 
chain of causation under the quasi-course employment test. 
(R.100). The activities undertaken by Mr. McKean were necessary 
and were daily activities. Cooking, repairing an automobile and 
repairing a steam radiator for heating purposes are all necessary 
and reasonable activities supporting the quasi-course of 
employment theory. 
POINT II 
THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION FROM THE PRIMARY INDUSTRIAL 
INJURY WAS NOT BROKEN BY APPLICANT'S CONDUCT. 
Appellants are correct in stating the general rule for 
compensation for injuries that are the result of an aggravation of 
the original industrial injury. It is well settled that any 
injury arising as a natural result of the primary injury is 
compensable. Professor Larson has stated: 
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out 
of and in the course of employment, every natural 
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises 
out of the employment, unless it is the result of an 
independent, intervening cause attributable to 
claimant's own intentional conduct. Larson, Volume I, 
Section 13. 
Under Professor Larson's analysis, any injury arising out of 
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a quasi-course of activity will not be deemed broken by mere 
negligence. However, an injury that does not arise out of a 
quasi-course of employment activity may be deemed to be the result 
of a broken chain of causation where the applicant is negligent 
misconduct. 
Appellants contend that Mr. McKean is not entitled to 
compensation for his subsequent burn injury, due to negligence on 
his part. Appellants contend that since Mr. McKean was 
experiencing numbness in his right arm and hand he was aware that 
he had no feeling in that arm and hand and, therefore, should have 
taken reasonable precautions against further injury. 
Appellants cite to the cases of Randolph v. E. I, Du Pont De 
Nemours Co,, 130 N.J.L. 353, 33 A.2d 301 (1943) and Sullivan v. B. 
& A. Construction , Inc., 122 N.Y.S.2d 571, revfg 307 
N.Y. 161, 120 N.E.2d 694 (1954), to illustrate that compensation 
will not be allowed to an applicant if negligence is shown on his 
part. At page nine of appellants1 brief they contend that the 
Sullivan case is applicable to the present fact situation. The 
Sullivan case dealt with a claimant whose right knee occasionally 
locked, rendering his leg useless. In the Sullivan case, the 
claimant's right knee locked while driving an automobile, he was 
unable to apply his brakes, and an accident occurred. The court 
in that case found that the claimant's injuries were not 
compensable due to his negligence since he had knowledge of his 
condition from simlar experiences in the past. The Sullivan case 
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is not applicable to the present fact situation however. Mr. 
McKean had no prior knowledge as to the loss of feeling or use in 
his arm and hand. Mr. McKean had never burned his hand prior to 
his injury of April 6. In fact, Mr. McKean testified that his 
doctor had informed him that his feeling would slowly begin to 
return to his arm and he further testified that he did in fact 
have seme feeling in the arm. Thus, based on the statements made 
by his doctor and by his prior experiences in the use of his hand 
and arm, Mr. McKean believed that he could proceed to use his arm 
in daily activities. Since Mr. McKean did have some feeling in 
his arm and hand, he felt there would be no serious threat to 
damaging the arm and hand further. 
Thus, the fact situations in the present case are more 
closely related to those in the Randolph case. In the Randolph 
case the claimant had an eye injury and was required to wear dark 
glasses. He fell down the stairs of his home late at night 
because his vision was impaired due to the dark glasses. The 
aggravation of his eye injury resulting from the fall was held to 
be a natural consequence of the original industrial injury and was 
thus compensable. 
In supporting this decision, the court in Sullivan stated 
that "if a reasonably prudent person innocently aggravates the 
harmful effect of the original injury, the original wrongful cause 
continues to the end, and accomplishes the final result." 
Randolph v. E. E. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 130 N.J.L. 353, 33 A.2d 
6 
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302 (1943). Mr. McKean!s injuries were the result of a loss of 
feeling in his arm and hand which was a consequence of his primary 
industrial injury. Thus, under the Randolph analysis, the chain 
of causation is not broken in the present case. 
Mr. McKean!s conduct was not unreasonable in light of his 
previous knowledge as to his condition and thus any conduct on the 
part of Mr. McKean contributing to the injury cannot be considered 
to be negligent. In Dutton v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 
140 Ariz. 448, 682 P.2d 453 (1984), the test for allowing 
compensation for consequences arising out of an industrial injury 
was put forth. 
First, a direct causal relationship must be 
establised between the initial industrial injury and the 
subsequent condition. Second, when the claimant1s 
conduct contributes to the incident causing the 
subsequent injury, his conduct must have been reasonable 
in light of his knowledge of his previous physical 
condition. 682 P.2d at t 456. 
Both elements of the above test are satisfied in the present 
case. As has been pointed out above, if it had not been for the 
original industrial accident, Mr. McKean would not have lost the 
feeling in his arm and hand and would have been able to prevent 
any subsequent burn injuries to his hand. Furthermore, Mr. McKean 
had some feeling in his arm and hand, and was told by his doctor 
that the feeling would slowly return to the injured area of his 
arm and hand. Mr. McKean had never burned his arm and hand prior 
to the April 6 incident. Thus his conduct was reasonable based on 
his past experiences. 
7 
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Appellants cite to the cases of Fruehauf Trailer Company v. 
Industrial Conmission, 16 Utah 2d 95, 396 P.2d 409 (1964) and 
Perchelli v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 25 Utah 2d 58, 475 
P.2d 835 (1970), as establishing the Utah position in compensation 
for subsequent injuries arising out of an industrial injury. 
Respondents do not dispute the findings of the Supreme court in 
Fruehauf and Perchelli. In fact, the Fruehauf and Perchelli cases 
support respondents position. In Fruehauf it was stated that "an 
aggravating cause which flares up a previous injury need not be 
the result of an accident which is independently employment 
connected." 396 P.2d at 410. This is clearly applicable to the 
present case. Appellants would argue that the present case is 
distinguishable from Fruehauf and Perchelli in that Mr. McKean was 
negligent in failing to put protection on his right arm and hand. 
However, Mr. McKean acted as a reasonable and prudent person would 
under similar circumstances. It is not common for individuals to 
wear heat-resistent gloves while working on cars nor while 
cooking. Therefore, Mr. McKeanfs failure to wear protective 
coverings on his arm and hand cannot be considered to be rash. 
Mr. McKean1s activities were considered to be reasonable and 
necessary daily activities. His conduct in participating in those 
activities cannot be considered to be negligent. Each was an 
activity that was necessary. It is unrealistic to expect that the 
applicant should refrain from participating in the above 
activities. It is also unreasonable in light of his knowledge at 
8 
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the time to have expected him to wear heat resistent gloves while 
participating in his daily activities. Mr. McKean acted as a 
reasonable and prudent person would have under similar 
circimstances. It is unlikely that Mr. McKean would have received 
the burn injury if he had not received his on-the-job injury. 
Thus, the State Insurance Fund and Mr. McKeanfs employer should be 
held liable for all expenses incurred by Mr. McKean for treatment 
of the burn injury to his right arm and hand. "Where a worker 
suffers an on-the-job injury and thereafter the condition 
resulting from that injury is worsened by an off-the-job injury, 
the compensation insurance carrier should be required to afford 
worker's compensation benefits for the worsened condition if the 
worker shows that the on-the-job injury is a material contributing 
cause of the worsened condition. Grable v. Weyerhaeuser, 55 
Or.App. 627, 639 P.2d 677, 678 (1982). Mr. McKean would not have 
burned his arm and hand had it not been for the original 
industrial accident and his conduct was not negligent in light of 
his knowledge at that time. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. McKean's burn injury is compensable because it was a 
natural consequence of the original industrial injury and was not 
the result of Mr. McKeanfs own negligent conduct. 
Based on the foregoing, the Industrial Ctonmiss ion's denial of 
appellant's Motion for Review should be upheld. 
9 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ?*& day of May, 1985. 
CORPORDN & WILLIAMS 
CHRIS D. NICHOLS 
Attorney for Respondent 
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